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The Politics
O f Violence

By Sulayman S. Nyang
ince the outbreak of the
Lebanese civil war in 1975, this
small country in the Middle East
has been in the news constantly.
Scholars and journalists have written
profusely about the civil war and, most
recently, about the expulsion of the
PLO (Palestine Liberation Organiza
tion) from Lebanon by the Israelis, fol
lowing the Israeli invasion of the coun
try. Added to the Israeli invasion was
the heightening of tensions and violence
between the two main religious com
munities in Lebanon, the Muslims and
the Christians.
What has actually complicated mat
ters in Lebanon is the history of exter
nal involvement in this Arab state.
There was the civil war of 1958 and the
intervention of the United States on
behalf of the Lebanese regime. The
U.S. was also destined to get involved
again in Lebanon in the 1980s. This
time, though, the role of the American
troops was that of a peacekeeper be
tween the Israelis and the Lebanese
milita groups who were fighting the
invading Israelis as well as other
Lebanese they perceived to be collabo
rating with the foreign enemy. How
ever, the U.S. forces ultimately did take
sides in their bombardment of Leba
nese “enemy” strongholds.

S

Background of the Present Conflict

The modem state of Lebanon came into
being after 1918 following the defeat of
the Ottoman Empire in World War I,
first under French mandatory rule from
1920, and as a soverign state since
November 1941. Its establishment can
celled the Mustasarrifiyah system
which had been adopted in Lebanon in
the 19th century after the civil war of
1860. This administrative arrangement
that granted extended autonomy to the
Christian inhabitants of Mount LebaPublished by Digital Howard @ Howard University,
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non was the result of Western pres
sures on the Ottoman rulers. The rise of
Greater Lebanon in 1920 ushered a new
situation and altered the power balance
between the various ethnic and relig
ious groupings within Lebanon. The
Mustasarrifiyah, which was character
ized by sectarian homogeneity, was
replaced by a new arrangement which
brought under one roof a large number
of Muslim and Christian sects, none of
which had an absolute majority. This
state of affairs was destined to affect
the course of history in the Arab world;
that is to say, the expansion of Lebanon
in 1920 paradoxically sowed the seeds
of its near destruction since the
mid-1970s.
Indeed, “the problem of Lebanon
since 1920 can be described as that of a
Christian minority, which has tradition
ally feared political and cultural assim
ilation and the loss of its national iden
tity in an Arab Muslim society but
which, by the realization of its aspira
tions for an independent state, created
the problem of a large Muslim minority,
which itself fears the loss of its own
identity in an essentially Christian
Lebanese state.. . ”1
In light of this analysis, one can argue
that the Lebanese civil war of 1975/76
was the latest expression of this conflict
dating back to 1920s when the French
decided to render to the Maronites of
Mount Lebanon all that they felt France
owed to them. Hence the decision to an
nex the surrounding areas—areas with
a large Muslim majority. The new state
of Lebanon incorporated the Beka’a
Valley, the Akkar region with its large
Greek Orthodox and Sunni population,
the southern region of Jabal Amel with
its predeominantly Shiite population,
and the western part where the coastal
Sunni towns of Tripoli and Sidon and
the major city of Beirut are located.
http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol12/iss4/16

To many historians, the decision to
create Greater Lebanon was carefully
studied by France, with the hope that
Lebanon could serve as an effective
French staging ground in the universe
of Superpower rivalry in the Middle
East. But the train of historical events
has not proven policymakers of the
French Republic correct. Lebanon
gradually became entangled in the large
web of Pan Arab politics, and her peo
ple began to shed blood of thenbrethren in the name of one sect or the
other. [Population estim ates of
Lebanon in 1974, one year before the
civil war, was 3.1 million, and in 1979
2.6 million.]
s a result of the strange way the
state of Lebanon came about,
the demographic balance was
shaken. In 1932 the govern
ment statistical data gave a breakdown
of those sects which inhabited Greater
Lebanon. It showed that the followers
of Christianity formed a six to five ma
jority. This ratio, five Muslims to six
Christians, was the basis of the political
arrangement between Muslim leaders
and their Christian counterparts at the
time of decolonization from France in
1941.
By adopting the above arrangement,
the Lebanese leaders introduced into
their political and social life a Lebanese
ethnic arithmetical formula that required
of all government posts to be parcelled
out according to the proportionate
representation of a given religious and
ethnic group in the country. Thus from
1932 onwards, the Lebanese govern
ment has learned to come to terms with
the religious division in the country. To
institutionalize the division, it made
sure that a factor of 11 was taken into
account in the allocation of positions in
government. Moreover, the Lebanese
elites agreed amongst themselves that

A

the President of the country always be a 19
Christian Maronite, the Prime Minister
a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker a Shiite
Muslim, and so on.
One dilemma of the Lebanese leader
ship since independence has been the
failure to realize that a rigid mathe
matical formula can never accommo
date rising new groups and political
forces. This sociological fact has
become evident to all Lebanese since
the eruption of the 1975 civil war. The
struggle for authority, power and influ
ence led to intense and at times deadly
competition among the Lebanese.
There was the competition between
Maronites against other Christians; the
struggle between the Christians and the
Muslims; the struggle between Sunnis
and Shiites. All these, however, took
place within the framework of the Zaim
system. Under this political arrange
ment, each grouping in the country has
its own leaders, who spoke for thenrespective communities. Their privilege
and prestige depended on how they per
formed before their colleagues and on
behalf of their communities.2
Geographical Distribution of
Lebanese Sects

The sectarian geography of the state of
Lebanon falls into four major regions:
■ Mount Lebanon, the home base of
the Maronites, has the largest Christian
groupings.
■ The Northwestern Region, which ex
tends from the coast to the western
mountains, including Tripoli and
Akkar, with a Sunni Muslim majority.
■ The Northeastern Region, which
forms the eastern slope of the Akkar
mountains, northern Beka’a and the
northern part of Lebanon’s eastern
mountain range, Ba’albek and Hermil
fall into this category, with a majority
Shiite Muslims.
■ The Southern Region, which extends
NEW DIRECTIONS OCTOBER 1985
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ment, but the forces of history were too
strong and no Lebanese leader was in a
position to resist the call for Arab unity
to tackle the emerging Israeli threat. As
etween these geographical cate a result of this development, the Leba
gories, or within them, one finds nese reluctantly joined the Arab caravan
pockets of the various sects and so assumed part of the burden of be
in the country. Three sects have ing a member of the Arab fraternity.
the highest dispersion rate. They are
What was the main responsibility of
the Maronites, the Sunnis and the
the
Lebanese leadership in the contest
Greek Orthodox. The Shiites and the
of
will
between the Arabs and the
Druzes have the lowest. The majority
Israelis?
As fate would have it, the
of Sunnis are found in major cities like
Lebanese
were pushed forward by
Sidon, Beirut and Tripoli. The Maro
changing
events
in the area to serve as
nites, at the beginning of independence
a
host
country
to
the Palestianians—
the majority by plurality, later began to
those
driven
out
of
Palestine by the
migrate to the cities in large numbers.
Israelis.
In looking into the distribution of
Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war,
sects across the length and breadth of a stream of Palestinians began to enter
Lebanon, one can argue that the pattern Lebanese society. By the time the 1975
of distribution has a logic to it. Accord
ing to Jamal al-Toubi, “there is a ten
dency among the Greek Orthodox to
The struggle for
coexist with the Sunni, the Greek
Catholic with the Shiite, and the Maro authority, power and
nites with the Druze.”3 He goes on to
influence led to intense
assert that this pattern of coexistence
between Lebanon’s groups was not and at times deadly
coincidential, rather the result of Mid
competition among the
dle East religious history. In the past,
interaction between sects rarely reached Lebanese.
beyond commercial transactions or per
sonal friendships.
Because of the above limitation, one
may now hold the view that perhaps the
insistence by Maronites on a sanctuary
for themselves in the province of Mount Lebanese civil war exploded, there
Lebanon is the result of their realization were more than 150,000 Palestinians in
that political power can get back to Lebanon. Initially, most of these men,
them only when they are in full com women and children were treated as
mand of events in Lebanon. Unlike the “refugees”. No efforts were made to
Shiites who look up to Iran’s Imam change their conditions. As a result of
Khomeini as their spiritual leader, the their growing frustration and dissatis
Maronites could count on only those of faction, the process of radicalization
their numbers living in Syria, Cyprus began to develop among the Palesti
and in other places in the Middle East. nians in Lebanon. In 1970, when King
So long as Maronite numerical strength Hussein of Jordan went on the offensive
remains the same, the Maronite leader against the Palestinians in his country,
ship would have no problem sitting his actions were the prologue to the real
down with the other Lebanese sectarian and bloody drama in Lebanon. What
happened in Jordan presaged what later
leaders to resolve common problems.
What has upset this Lebanese polit developed in Lebanon. The king’s men
ical applecart? Consider these key stormed the Palestinian strongholds
and wiped them out, forcing thousands
factors:
The creation of the state of Israel to flee to Lebanon, where they swelled
made it very difficult for the Lebanese the ranks of their compatriots who
to bolt the Arab caravan and work out belonged to an earlier generation of
direct and close relationship with the refugees.

from the slopes of Jabal Sheikh in the
east to the Sidon-Tyre coast, with a
Shiite majority.

B

West. It is true that some Lebanese fac
This sudden increase in the number
tions would have liked this arrange of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon was
Published
by Digital
Howard
@ Howard University,
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destabilizing to the Lebanese political
system and became socially stressful
due to the increase in conflict between
the various factions in the Lebanese
religious system. In retrospect, one can
argue that the arrival of the Palestinians
complicated what was already a com
plex and dangerous social and political
order in the Middle East.4
The discovery of oil in the Gulf
states, another key factor, contributed
to the expansion of the Lebanese econ
omy. The Gulf leaders saw in Lebanon
a financial haven for their deposits and a
place to relax and play. As a result of the
enormous investments in Lebanon, the
economy boomed and many Lebanese
profitted from the changed economic
conditions. Another important factor
was the emergence in 1964 of the
Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO).
s I noted earlier, 1970 was a bad
year for the Palestinians. And
due to the dissatisfaction of the
young Palestinians who were
denied the right to a homeland, many of
them decided to take up the challenge
and wage their own battles with Israel.
Men like George Habash founded their
movements and the variegated groups
within the Palestinian community were
soon brought together under one roof.
They set out and launched a series of
attacks against Israeli or Israelisupported targets. These acts of terror,
for the first time, drew the attention of
the world to the plight of the Palesti
nians who for a long time were treated
as “refugees”.
The leaders of the United States and
the world began to pay attention.
Although in Washington no positive
response to the PLO was made, there is
enough evidence to prove that attitudes
towards and opinions on the Palestinian
problem changed remarkably. This
change of image for the Palestinians
and the PLO had an impact on the
Lebanese society. Those social groups
in Lebanon who felt cheated and short
changed by the system saw an ally in
the PLO and its leader Yasir Arafat.
And when the Jordanians drove away
the Palestinians, many of these
Lebanese received the fleeing Palesti
nians with open arms.

A

The Palestinian Presence

In examining the impact of the Palestin
3
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ian presence in Lebanon and the role of
the Palestinians in the civil war, four
points can be made here.
First, it should be noted that one can
discern the mode o f perception of the
various groupings in the Lebanese
conflict if one analyzes the words used
for the violent struggle raging in the
country.
The Maronite leadership perceived
the struggle as the “war” (al-harb), thus
emphasizing that it is essentially a
Lebanese-Palestinian conflict. Those
Lebanese opposed to the status quo saw
the conflict as a revolution (al-thawra),
thereby justifying their support for the
Palestinians and the need for a political
reform in their country. The Palesti
nians who collaborated with the Leba
nese rejectionists, on the other hand,
perceived the struggle as a civil war
(harb-ahliya), thus identifying it as a
Lebanese-Lebanese fight and not a
Lebanese-Palestinian conflict.
Second, up to 1982 when the Israelis
decided to launch operation Peace for
Galilee, this was how the conflict in
Lebanon was perceived by the various
forces in the country. Thus, the Israeli
factor was minimal. However, it should
be noted that some of the Christian
leaders, such as the late Lebanese
President Bashir Gemayel, collaborated
with the Israelis before and after their
1982 invasion of Lebanon. These Maro
nite Christians saw in Israel a covert if
not an overt ally in their battle with the
Palestinians.
The Israeli factor, which Bashir
Gemayel hoped would enable the Chris
tians in general, and Maronites in par
ticular, to establish a separate state
called the Republic of Juniyah, became
a liability to the Christians during and
after the invasion. In retrospect, one
can now argue that the Israeli invasion
helped accelerate the process of radicalization among the Lebanese militants.
Because the Israelis humiliated them,
many of those Christians who earlier
rallied around the invaders began to
waver in their support. Conditions
deteriorated dramatically following the
Sabra and Chatila massacres. Israel suf
fered embarrassment in the interna
tional community, and Christian
groups—such as the Phalangists and
the small militia of Saad Haddad—
http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol12/iss4/16

became increasingly alienated from
Israel.
In fact, the conflict between the Phal
angists and the Israelis predated the
Sabra and Chatila massacres of Pales
tinians by pro-Israeli Christian militia.
In their calculations and preparations
for the invasion of Lebanon, the Israeli
strategists factored the Phalangists of
the late Bashir Gemayel, who was
assassinated three weeks after his 1981
election. But the late president, at the
time just a leader of a major faction,
found the Israeli proposal unacceptable.
Not only was he fearful of the conse
quences of dancing a political tango
with Israel in public but he and his aides
soon realized the economic conse
quences of Israeli penetration of the
Lebanese market, an important pre-

The sudden increase in
the number of Pales
tinian refugees in
Lebanon was destabiliz
ing the Lebanese
political system. . .

serve of the Maronite merchants in
Beirut. Indeed it is a fact that the Phal
angists made it a point to warn their
merchants and shopkeepers in Beirut
not to buy goods from Israel.
Third, the decision of the Lebanese
government to give a blind eye to the
shipment of arms into areas close to the
Israeli border facilitated the develop
ment of an arms buildup in the Pales
tinian strongholds. Added to this was
the wide circulation of weapons
throughout the country. Thus when the
civil war broke out, each community
and the various militias were virtually
armed to the teeth. The Palestinians, as
stockpilers of arms for the struggle
against the state of Israel, became a
useful ally to the Lebanese radicals who
in earlier times suffered at the hands of
the rulers of the Lebanese state. This
fact sheds light on the nature of the

Lebanese conflict and the reasons for
the Israeli invasion.
elated to the third point is the
fourth factor, the Syrian role in
the civil war. Syria’s role in the
Lebanese crisis was inevitable
because of a number of reasons. Arab
nationalists have always dreamed of a
Greater Syria merger of the states
which the British and the French seized
from the faltering Ottoman Empire.
However, their wish was never to mate
rialize because neither the Western
powers nor the Christian minorities in
the region were sufficiently interested
in the realization of such a dream. As a
result, the Syrian leadership decided
reluctantly to concede the indepen
dence of Lebanon.
When the civil war broke out, the
Syrians, who had allies still committed
to the merger idea, felt it necessary to
assert their presence. Using geopolit
ical arguments, they warned the vari
ous Lebanese parties about the danger
to Syrian interests and the possibility of
Israeli manipulation of the crisis. But
this Syrian concern was not heeded by
the more powerful groups. At the time,
each faction was preoccupied with its
territory and the danger posed to it by
the rival groups. With the escalation of
the violence and the greater insecurity
of the Arab countries and their interests
in Lebanon, an Arab peacekeeping force
was hurriedly formed by the Arab
League. This effort by the League pro
ved unsatisfactory and in the end the
Arab states, through the League,
agreed to leave the peacekeeping func
tion to Syria. With a mandate to restore
law and order, the government of Presi
dent Hafez al-Assad sent troops into
Lebanon. This was to be the long
assignment of the Syrian army outside
its borders. They came, fought and got
bogged down in the cycle of violence in
Lebanon. Law was partially maintained
and order partially restored.
Trying to balance the competing fac
tions in Lebanon, the Syrians began the
delicate task of strengthening favorites
and weakening potential enemies.
While the Palestinian leadership,
under Yasir Arafat, collaborated with
Syria, events favored them well in
Lebanon. This state of affairs continued
until the Israelis felt that life for Jewish
settlers in the areas bordering Lebanon
was no longer bearable.

R
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any reasons have been given
by the Israelis for their inva
sion of Lebanon. But in retro
spect, one can now argue that
the Israeli leadership came to realize
some of its misperceptions and the
unexpected blunders committed by
some of its field commanders. The
Sabra and Chatila massacres became
the straw that broke the camel’s back.
As a result of worldwide outcry, the
Israeli government decided to make
certain changes in policy. And it ac22 cepted the resignation of Defense
Minister Ariel Sharon, following in
vestigation by a blue ribbon panel.

M

The Role of Fundamentalists

Up until the eruption of the Iranian
Revolution in 1979, the Shiites in
Lebanon were the invisible men of the
Lebanese society. Relegated to lower
status in the social hierarchy and con
demned to play second fiddle to the
Christian and Sunni Muslim fellow citi
zens, they lived very much in poverty
and rage. The outbreak of the civil war
transformed their community from a
passive into an active/assertive one.
Allied to the Palestinians in their strug
gle for respectability in Lebanese soci
ety and looking for opportunities for
themselves, they set out to create their
own political niche in Lebanon. But
when the Palestinians were routed by
Israeli troops, some of the Shiite lead
ers and villagers began to collaborate
with the Israelis.
The Israelis saw the Shiites and other
minorities in Lebanon as potential allies
against the Syrians, the Palestinians
and the Sunni Muslims. Thus when
Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, the
Israeli commanders made it clear that
they were in search of local Lebanese
collaborators.
The Israelis, who long before the civil
war had established contacts with
Christian rightists in Lebanon, were
seeking Shiite and Druze Lebanese to
work with them against the Pales
tinians and the Syrians. Some of the
Shiites agreed to cooperate and were
thus provided with a steady flow of
arms. But unknown to the Israelis, the
Shiites were playing the age-old game
of tahiya (holy deception) with their
Israeli benefactors. Arms furnished to
Shiites in the Souf region of Lebanon
found their way into Beirut and soon
Published
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Israeli soldiers were being killed with
arms supplied by their government.
It was indeed this state of affairs that
made the Israeli invasion a trap. Be
tween September 1982 and November
1983, the Israelis suffered more than
147 fatalities in Lebanon. This figure
may be insignificant to an American but
any self-respecting Israeli leader cannot
tolerate such statistics. It was owing to
this shifting fortune in Lebanon that the
Israeli leaders decided to wring conces
sions from the Lebanese regime, this
time headed by President Amin
Gemayel.
The Lebanese government, banking
on full U.S. support, engaged in the
politics of foot-dragging and as a result
stalled talks with Israel. The Israelis
kept on putting more pressure and
finally got an agreement worked out for
a conditional pullback of Israeli troops.
But as history would have it, this was a
temporary victory. The agreement was
rejected by many Lebanese, who saw it
as the beginning of the end of the inde
pendence of their country. The Syrians,
who have a vested interest in Lebanon,
decided to wage a campaign of vilifica
tion and subversion of the agreement.
he pressure was on the Gemayel
government, which in the end
unilaterally abrogated the agree
ment.5 This was a shock to the
Israelis and the Israeli government
issued a strong warning to the Leba
nese about the dangers involved in such
an act. However, nothing happened
from the Israeli side.
Other factors must have affected the
Gemayel decision. The Syrian pressure
was high but the deterioration in the
military and political power of the Phalangists and the untenability of any
close association with Israel most likely
influenced President Gemayel and his
advisers. And, bent on avoiding the
destiny of his late brother but deter
mined to work closely with both the
U.S. and Syria, Amin Gemayel took the
decision that for him was the path of
sanity and survivability.
Because of the deterioration in the
power of the central government in
Beirut and the increasing strength of
the various factions, the Shiites and the
other fundamentalists began to assert
themselves more visibly.
The creation of an Islamic state in
Iran made it possible for the Lebanese
http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol12/iss4/16
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Shiites to have a powerful Big Brother
in the neighborhood. Prior to the 1979,
the government of the Shah did not pay
particular attention to the fortunes of
the Shiites in other parts of the Middle
East. This was not to be the case with
the Khomeini regime.
Since the Iranian revolution, many
Lebanese Shiites have made pilgrim
ages to Iran to re-establish contacts
with their fellow Shiites. Because of
these contacts, the Shiites in Lebanon
soon began to build stronger and more
powerful alliances with other radical

The Israeli factor,
which Bashir Gemayel
hoped would enable the
Christians. . . to establish
a separate state. . .
became a liability. . .

groups in the Middle East. True, radi
cal Muslim groups existed in Lebanon
prior to the outbreak of the civil war but
their impact was virtually nil. The ap
parent secularism of the pre-war period
made them irrelevant in Lebanese
society.
Conditions changed for the better for
the fundamentalist groups in Lebanon
during the late 1970s when the radicalization process as well as the eruption
of the Iranian revolution made it appeal
ing to assert openly one’s fundamental
ist allegiance. Hence the emergence of
the more Islamized segment of the
Amal and the more fundamentalist
Hizbullah.6 These two groups are simply
the coordinators of the activities among
the various Shiite and fundamentalist
groups in the area. They may have con
trol over some of the groups but each
group has its agenda and its own per
sonnel.
The U.S. Role

The United States became a factor in
Lebanon only after the Second World
War. But American missionaries and
merchants plied the seas and took risks

working in the Levant long before the
dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In
fact, the irony is, the leaders of the PLO
which the U.S. does not recognize are
the intellectual products of the
American University of Beirut, a legacy
of American missionary labor and phil
anthropy. Regardless of this manifesta
tion of history’s game of anomalies and
ironies in human society, a good look at
the American record in Lebanon is in
order. First, be it noted that the initial
American military involvement was in
1958, in response to a call from then
President Camille Chamoun. Threat
ened by the rising forces of Arab
nationalism under Egypt’s Gamal
Abdul Nassar and determined to face
the challenge, President Chamoun ap
pealed to the late U.S. President
Dwight Eisenhower. Approximately
10,000 American troops went to his
rescue in July 1958, and law and order
was restored. America’s prestige was
universally recognized and the Ameri
can troops returned home a short time
later, standing tall.
During the second American involve
ment in the 1980s, the picture seems to
have changed radically. Two things ex
plain this development. First, the civil
war had changed the Lebanese mental
ity from what it was in the 1950s. In
stead of a people led by Zaims (tradi
tional leaders), the Lebanese the Ameri
cans encountered in 1983 were tough,
opportunistic, assertive and fanatically
committed to one ideology or the other.
Second, American prestige in Lebanon
and elsewhere was devalued by the
Vietnam syndrome. For this reason, out
siders were more willing to challenge
America’s right to be the policeman of
the world.
In Lebanon, Islamic fundamentalism,
for the most part, contributed very
much to the changed attitudes of the
average Muslim Lebanese, Sunni or
Shiite. Emboldened by the success of
the Iranian militants and reassured of a
life after death by their mullahs, many
of the Shiites in Lebanon fought the
Americans and the Israelis with the
firm belief that a jihad (holy war)
against America or Israel was not only
rewarding spiritually but materially
significant.
To the Shiites of the Amal, a chal
lenge to the U.S. was the beginning of
the end of Christian hegemony in LebaNEW DIRECTIONS OCTOBER 1985
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non. The argument is made that “we
lick the Yankee protector of Maronite
privilege, then the Maronite would
sooner or later come to terms with us.”
This is a powerful argument. The only
way one can refute it, perhaps, is to pay
the same price that the holder is willing
to pay. That is, the will to die at any
time for a cause. Not many Lebanese
Christians are that committed. Hence
the exodus of many Christians from
Lebanon to the U.S. and other points in
the world. Because of this emigration,
24 some analysts are convinced that the
Shiites are now close to 40 percent of
the Lebanese population. These statis
tics are difficult to prove because Leba
non has not conducted a census since
1932.
he politics of numbers has been a
thorn in the Lebanese body poli
tic and, as is true of pluralistic
societies, its leaders are reluctant
to face the uncertainty of a head count.
Even if one does not accept the figure
bandied about in certain circles about
the strong Shiite presence in Lebanon,
one must concede that over the past 18
months the Shiites have made their
point to the U.S. and to the rest of the
world, particularly to the Gemayel
regime.
President Reagan reminded the
American public, in a letter to Congress
dated March 30, 1984, that American
participation in the multinational force
(MNF) resulted in “grievous losses” in
terms of 264 military personnel killed
and 137 wounded in service. This act of
terror against the U.S. was perpetrated
by one of the radical groups operating
in Lebanon.7
To add insult to injury, they also kid
napped a number of American civilians
and most gruesomely assassinated one
of the best friends of the Arabs among
American scholars, Malcolm Kerr. (A
distinguished scholar with a charming
personality, Kerr went to Lebanon to
take up the presidency of the American
University of Beirut. He was very
enthusiastic about his mission when I
last saw him at a conference at Duke
University.) Thus Malcolm Kerr, too,
was a victim of the cycle of violence in
Lebanon.
Many more Americans died or were
injured as a result of the irrational war
in this once peaceful land. But what fur
ther created a serious problem for the
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Reagan administration was the recent
hijacking [to Beirut] of a Trans World
Airlines jet on a flight from Athens to
Rome. Hostages were taken and one
American serviceman killed. The
hijackers demanded the immediate
release of more than 700 Shiites who
were taken to Israel and imprisoned by
the Israelis at the time of their with
drawal from southern Lebanon. In
assessing the causes and consequences
of the hijacking, one can put forth four
points.

The Syrians came as a
peacekeeping force, but
in the very execution of
that task they created
enemies and further
compounded the
problem.

First, the groups that claimed respon
sibility for the hijacking belonged to
small splinter associations within the
Lebanese fundamentalists. Clouded in
secrecy, and ruthless in their dealings
with the external forces, these clandes
tine groups have been difficult to pene
trate. As a result, they have been able
to operate with impunity within Leba
non. This was very evident during the
recent hostage crisis.
Second, this group or any other clan
destine operation usually has foreign or
local financial backers. And since these
backers are, in most instances, at
loggerheads with the U.S. or its allies in
the Middle East, they care very little
about the outcome of their clients’ acts
of terror. This has become very evident
in the last 20 years, as the acts of terror
ism became the work of both govern
ments and private dissident groups.
Third, the lower social and political
status of the Shiites in Lebanon has
made them quite willing to upset the
Lebanese balance of power. They had
so little to lose.
Fourth, sensing the close alliance be
tween Syria and Iran, the Shiites feel
that Big Brother Syria can be very help
ful in the future distribution of

resources and political power in Leba
non. Hence the opportunistic game of
taking two steps towards Damascus
and moving one step backwards
towards Beirut.
Conclusions

he Lebanese situation involves a
host of forces, each with its own
particular agenda. Added to this
is the role of external forces.
Given this reality, I offer the following
conclusions:
■ The current Lebanese crisis which
started in 1975 went through three
phases.
First, it began as a struggle for power
between some Lebanese factions but
soon deteriorated into a conflict be
tween the radicals and the status quo
defenders.
Second, the struggle became more
complicated with the intrusion of
regional powers such as Syria and
Israel. These two countries, trying to
capitalize on the confusion in this small
country, exacerbated the conflict.
The Syrians came as a peacekeeping
force, but in the very execution of that
task they created enemies and further
compounded the problem.
The Israelis, on the other hand, came
to Lebanon as invaders because they
felt their national interest was threat
ened. Hence Operation Peace for
Galilee. This act of self-interest on the
part of the government of then Prime
Minister Menachem Begin backfired
with the discovery of the Sabra and
Chatila massacres, an atrocity which
was not committed by the Israelis but
got Israel’s reputation tainted through
association with Lebanese renegades
such as Saad Haddad and his Christian
militia.
The Israelis tried to clean their image
immediately by setting up a Commis
sion of Enquiry and later by asking for
the resignation of Ariel Sharon.
Third, the struggle in Lebanon pro
gressed a stage further when the com
bination of the radicalization process
and the emergence of Islamic funda
mentalism made the appearance of
small terroristic bands fashionable.
Hence the internationalization of the
Lebanese crisis.
■ The Lebanese crisis made it clear
that in this age of nuclear weapons, a
small band of guerrillas/terrorists can
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render big arms irrelevant. The way in
which the U.S. hurriedly retreated from
Lebanon, and the large number of casu
alties suffered by the Israelis, makes it
clear that more attention must be given
to dissident groups in the formulation of
strategy and policy.
■ The level of violence in Lebanon has
reached a point whereby death is com
monplace and life is precarious in the
streets of Beirut and other cities and
towns. Because of this development,
one wonders how the international
powers can help in the stabilization of
Lebanon.
■ Due to the changed situations in
future political arrangements, the
Shiites and the Druzes must be taken
into account. They have both amassed
much power in Lebanon, and thencapacity to inflict pain and fear makes
http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol12/iss4/16

them both dangerous and politically
worthy of negotiation.
Ironically, one may conclude, it took
Israel’s invasion for the Shiites to
replace the Palestinians in the Lebanese
situation as a community of well-armed
people in a position to extract conces
sions hitherto unthinkable.
□ *12
Sulayman S. Nyang, Ph.D. is associate professor
of government and public administration at
Howard University.
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